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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

JCSM-307-67

-1 JUN 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Draft Memorandum for the President on Future Actions in Vietnam (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to:

a. JCSM-218-67, dated 20 April 1967, subject: "Force Requirements - Southeast Asia FY 1968 (U)"; JCSM-286-67, dated 20 May 1967, subject: "Operations Against North Vietnam (U)"; and JCSM-288-67, dated 20 May 1967, subject: "Worldwide US Military Posture (U)."

b. Draft memorandum for the President (DPM), dated 19 May 1967, subject: "Future Actions in Vietnam," which was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment.

2. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the DPM. The DPM addresses two basic courses of action: Course A - adds a minimum of 200,000 men to the Southeast Asia commitment and includes major ground operations and intensified air and naval actions outside South Vietnam, especially against North Vietnam; Course B - limits force increases to no more than 30,000 men, avoids extending the ground conflict beyond the borders of South Vietnam, and concentrates the bombing on the infiltration routes south of 20°. The DPM generally implies that Course A reflects the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, Course A is an extrapolation of a number of proposals which were recommended separately but not in combination or as interpreted in the DPM. The combination force levels, deployments, and military actions of Course A do not accurately reflect the positions or recommendations of COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The positions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which provide a better basis against which to compare other alternatives, are set forth in JCSM-218-67, JCSM-286-67, and JCSM-288-67. Five major areas of concern have been identified in the DPM. They are discussed under the following headings:

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- a. Objectives (Part I, Appendix A).
- b. Military Strategy and Operations (Other than Air/Naval Operations in the North) (Part II, Appendix A).
- c. Military Strategy for Air/Naval War in the North (Part III, Appendix A).
- d. Domestic Attitude and Predicted Reactions (Part IV, Appendix A).
- e. International Attitude and Predicted Reactions (Part V, Appendix A).

3. ~~(TOP SECRET)~~ Objectives. The preferred course of action addressed in the DPM (Course B) is not consistent with NSAM 288 or with the explicit public statements of US policy and objectives enumerated in Part I, Appendix A, and in Appendix B. The DPM would, in effect, limit US objectives to merely guaranteeing the South Vietnamese the right to determine their own future on the one hand and offsetting the effect of North Vietnam's application of force in South Vietnam on the other. The United States would remain committed to these two objectives only so long as the South Vietnamese continue to help themselves. It is also noted that the DPM contains no statement of military objectives to be achieved and that current US national, military, and political objectives are far more comprehensive and far-reaching (Appendix B). Thus:

a. The DPM fails to appreciate the full implications for the Free World of failure to achieve a successful resolution of the conflict in Southeast Asia.

b. Modification of present US objectives, as called for in the DPM, would undermine and no longer provide a complete rationale for our presence in South Vietnam or much of our effort over the past two years.

c. The positions of the more than 35 nations supporting the Government of Vietnam might be rendered untenable by such drastic changes in US policy.

4. ~~(TOP SECRET)~~ Military Strategy and Operations (Other than Air/Naval Operations in the North). The DPM favors Course B with inadequate analysis of its implications for conduct of the war in Vietnam. The strategy embodied in this alternative - largely designed to "make do" with military resources currently

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approved for Southeast Asia - would not permit early termination of hostilities on terms acceptable to the United States, supporting Free World nations, and the Government of Vietnam. The force structure envisaged provides little capability for initiative action and insufficient resources to maintain momentum required for expeditious prosecution of the war. Further, this approach would result in a significant downgrading of the Revolutionary Development Program considered so essential to the realization of our goals in Vietnam. It would also result in the abandonment of the important delta region on the basis of its being primarily a problem for the Republic of Vietnam to solve without additional external assistance. (See Part II, Appendix A, for additional comments.)

5. ~~(S)~~ Military Strategy for Air/Naval War in the North. The DPM stresses a policy which would concentrate air operations in the North Vietnamese "funnel" south of 20°. The concept of a "funnel" is misleading, since in fact the communists are supplying their forces in South Vietnam from all sides, through the demilitarized zone, Laos, the coast, Cambodia, and the rivers in the Delta. According to the DPM, limiting the bombing to south of 20° might result in increased negotiation opportunities with Hanoi. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that such a new self-imposed restraint resulting from this major change in strategy would most likely have the opposite effect. The relative immunity granted to the LOCs and distribution system outside the Panhandle would permit: (a) a rapid recovery from the damage sustained to date; (b) an increase in movement capability; (c) a reduced requirement for total supplies in the pipeline; (d) a concentration of air defenses into the Panhandle; and (e) a release of personnel and equipment for increased efforts in infiltration of South Vietnam. Also, it would relieve the Hanoi leadership from experiencing at first hand the pressures of recent air operations which foreign observers have reported. Any possible political advantages gained by confining our interdiction campaign to the Panhandle would be offset decisively by allowing North Vietnam to continue an unobstructed importation of war materiel. Further, it is believed that such a drastic reduction in the scale of air operations against North Vietnam could only result in the strengthening of the enemy's resolve to continue the war. No doubt the reduction in scope of air operations would also be considered by many as a weakening of US determination and a North Vietnamese victory in the air war over northern North Vietnam. The combination of reduced military pressures against North Vietnam with stringent limitations of our operations in South Vietnam, as suggested in Course B, appears even more questionable conceptually. It would most likely strengthen the enemy's ultimate hope of victory and lead to a redoubling of his efforts. (See Part III, Appendix A, for additional comments.)

6. (S) Domestic Attitude and Predicted Reactions. The DPM presents an assessment of US public attitude and assumed reactions to several occurrences. Its orientation is toward the risks involved in Course A. The difficulty of making accurate judgments in the area of public response is acknowledged, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concede that their appraisal is subject to the same degree of uncertainty that is inherent in the DPM. Nevertheless, they are unable to find due cause for the degree of pessimism expressed in the DPM. The Joint Chiefs of Staff firmly believe that the American people, when well informed about the issues at stake, expect their Government to uphold its commitments. History illustrates that they will, in turn, support their Government in its necessary actions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that there is no significant sentiment for peace at any price. They believe also that despite some predictable debate a Reserve callup would be willingly accepted, and there would be no "irresistible" drive from any quarter for unnecessary escalation of the conflict. (See Part IV, Appendix A, for additional comments.)

7. (S) International Attitude and Predicted Reaction. There are several inconsistencies between the DPM and the published intelligence estimates. For example, from these intelligence estimates, there is no evidence that Hanoi is prepared to shun negotiation, regardless of the pressure brought to bear, until after the US elections. Also, it is estimated that US prestige will not decline appreciably if prompt military action is taken to bring the conflict to an early close. In the long term, US prestige would probably rise. The effect of signs of US irresolution on allies in Southeast Asia and other friendly countries threatened by communist insurgency could be most damaging to the credibility of US commitments. The DPM contains the view that there is strong likelihood of a confrontation between the United States and the CHICOMs or the USSR, as a result of intensification of air and naval operations against North Vietnam and/or a major increase in US forces in South Vietnam. Intelligence estimates do not support this contention. (See Part V, Appendix A, for additional comments.)

8. (S) Impact on US and Free World Armed Forces. Curtailment of air operations in North Vietnam (as proposed in Course B) will undoubtedly have an adverse effect upon US and Free World Armed Forces in the field.

9. (S) Most of the foregoing divergencies between the DPM and the stated policies, objectives, and concepts are individually important and are reason for concern. However, when viewed collectively, an alarming pattern emerges which suggests a

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major realignment of US objectives and intentions in Southeast Asia without regard for the long-term consequences. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are not aware of any decision to retract the policies and objectives which have been affirmed by responsible officials many times in recent years (Appendix B). Thus, the DPM lacks adequate foundation for further consideration.

10. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that:

a. The DPM does not support current US national policy and objectives in Vietnam and should not be considered further.

b. There is no basis for change in their views on the major issues in the DPM. These views are adequately stated in recent memorandums and reinforced herein.

c. The US national policy and objectives should be reaffirmed.

d. The US military objectives for Vietnam as restated in JCSM-218-67 support current US policy and objectives.

e. Implementation of Course B would serve to prolong the conflict, reinforce Hanoi's belief in ultimate victory, and probably add greatly to the ultimate cost in US lives and treasure.

11. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. The DPM NOT be forwarded to the President.

b. The US national objective as expressed in NSAM 288 be maintained, and the national policy and objectives for Vietnam as publicly stated by US officials be reaffirmed.

c. The military objective, concept, and strategy for the conduct of the war in Vietnam as stated in JCSM-218-67 be approved by the Secretary of Defense.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

EARLE G. WHEELER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachments

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APPENDICES A AND B  
TO JCSM-307-67

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NOTE: Bibliography on page A-8

1. OBJECTIVES
1. Abstracts:
- a. DPM: (1) Proposed US objective is to permit South Vietnamese to choose own future; commitment ceases if SVN ceases to help itself.  
(2) No stated military objectives.  
(3) No stated political objectives.  
(4) Support US objective as stated in RSM 208 - to ensure independent non-communist South Vietnam.
- b. JCS: (1) Proposed US objective is to ensure an independent non-communist South Vietnam.  
(2) Military objectives - make difficult SVN support of VC and cause RVN to cease direction of VC; defeat VC/RVA; extend GVN control over SVN; deter or be prepared to defeat CHUCOM intervention.
2. Specific Issues:

SPECIFIC ISSUE	DPM ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/CJCS OR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
<p>1 US National objectives - commitment</p>	<p>Our minimum objective - commitment - in Vietnam is only to see that the people of South Vietnam are permitted to determine their own future. This commitment ceases if the country ceases to help itself.</p> <p>Our commitment is NOT to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- expel South Vietnam regroupees from South Vietnam.</li> <li>- ensure that a particular person or group remains in power, nor</li> <li>- ensure that the South Vietnamese remain in the corner of the anti-communist</li> <li>- guarantee that the anti-communist</li> <li>- insist that the Independent South Vietnam remain separate from North Vietnam.</li> </ul>	<p>RSM 208, 17 March 1966, states the US objective in South Vietnam as follows: "We seek an independent non-communist South Vietnam." The US National objective is to ensure an independent South Vietnam free of Communist subversion and able to determine its own government and national aspirations; ...</p>	<p>JCSM 602-66 JCSM 218-67 JCSM 792-66</p>
<p>2 Military objectives in Southeast Asia</p>	<p>Both courses of action are developed without benefit of any statement of military objectives.</p> <p>The implication is that the objective for Course A with the associated force augmentation is:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- to bring additional military pressure to bear on the enemy in the South while continuing to carry out our present missions not directly related to combating enemy main force units.</li> </ul> <p>The implication is that the objectives for the associated bombing strategy are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- to stabilize and to lift the morale of the people in the South.</li> <li>- to add to the pressure on Hanoi to end the war.</li> <li>- to reduce the flow and/or to increase the cost of infiltrating men and material from north to south.</li> </ul> <p>The implied military objectives for Course B are to improve the negotiating environment and to stop infiltration.</p>	<p>Military objectives are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- to make it as difficult and costly as possible for RVN to continue effective support of the VC and to cause RVN to cease direction of the VC insurgency.</li> <li>- to defeat the VC and North Vietnamese Armed Forces in SVN and force the withdrawal of NVA forces from South Vietnam.</li> <li>- to extend Government of South Vietnam dominion, direction, and control over South Vietnam.</li> <li>- to deter the Chinese communists from direct intervention in Southeast Asia and to deter the USSR from direct intervention in Southeast Asia and to be prepared to deter such intervention if it occurs.</li> </ul>	<p>JCSM 218-67</p>
<p>3 Political Objectives for Southeast Asia</p>	<p>The political objectives stated are those contained within the statements above regarding national objectives plus the following inferred political objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- initiate a "cool" down to settle war.</li> <li>- lay groundwork for periodic peace probes with associated limitation of bombing.</li> <li>- seek possible compromise involving role in SVN for members of VC.</li> </ul>	<p>See Appendix B</p>	

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11. MILITARY STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS (Other than air/naval operations in the North)

1. Abstract:

- a. **DIR:** The preferred strategy is essentially that of a continuation of combat operations at the current level with forces currently approved. US combat troops will be removed from the Delta. Increase utilization of RVN and third-country forces in logistical support role in order to release additional US forces for combat role. US efforts will be shifted from the pacification/ID role with the ARVN assuming responsibility for the Delta. Plans on seeking accommodation through reduction of pressures exerted in the North and possible future political role for the VC in the South.
- b. **JCS:** The strategy recommended by the JCS conditions a modification and broad increase in military pressure with which the enemy cannot cope; maintaining momentum and initiative which will permit the RVN to take over the war in the South and provide an adequate security environment in which ID can progress. Provide, through a selected calling of reserves, forces adequate to conclude the war in Vietnam and to provide a more flexible and responsive worldwide military posture.

2. Specific Issues:

SPECIFIC ISSUE	DPM ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/US OR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
1. Strategic Concept	<p>DPM preferred strategic concept:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Continue ground operations with forces currently approved.</li> <li>b. Make more efficient use of US manpower by: (1) Army achieving the pacification and ID role; (2) ARVN assuming the combat role; (3) US forces being "faced up"; and (4) getting more support from RVN and other third countries.</li> <li>c. Primary responsibility for pacification and ID rests with the RVN.</li> <li>d. Initiate a "cool" drive to settle war.</li> <li>e. Lay groundwork for periodic peace probes with associated limitations of combat.</li> <li>f. Seek possible compromise involving role in SVN for members of VC.</li> </ul> <p>The DPM preferred concept of operations, course B, does not include the calling up of the Reserves.</p>	<p>The JCS recommended strategic concept:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Apply degree of pressure which is beyond enemy's capability to accommodate.</li> <li>b. Intensify operations so as to create a secure environment in which the RVN can take over the war in the South in coordination with OVN programs.</li> <li>c. Provide adequate forces to counter increased enemy pressure in the Delta and to maintain the initiative throughout Vietnam by:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Destruction of the enemy main force.</li> <li>(2) Locate and destroy district and provincial guerrilla forces.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	JCSM 215-67
2. Reserve's Callup	<p>The DPM preferred concept of operations, course B, does not include the calling up of the Reserves.</p>	<p>The JCS have recommended a selective callup of Reserves in order to more effectively fulfill US worldwide commitments while conducting the war in Vietnam so as to terminate it at an early date on terms favorable to US interests.</p>	JCSM 280-67
3. Strategic Flexibility	<p>The DPM does not consider the requirement for strategic flexibility; and therefore provides no option for further military pressure or withdrawal of forces. The DPM does not consider the possibility of peace for a protracted period or takes a turn for the worse. Further military operations in Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam are specifically excluded. "...If COURSE B is chosen, it must be made clear to the JCS that military leaders believe that the troop limit is firm and absolute. An alternative will be to make progress, even though it be slow..."</p>	<p>The concept recommended by the JCS not only provides the resources for a prompt application of military pressure within South Vietnam but also provides forces to support the RVN in the event that the strategic initiative elsewhere in Southeast Asia should be required. The JCS does not consider the possibility of peace on the periphery of South Vietnam. More importantly, this posture provides the US with the essential capability of strategic flexibility.</p>	JCSM 280-67
4. Progress of ID Efforts	<p>The National Liberation Front (NLF) continues to control large parts of South Vietnam, and there is little evidence that the revolutionary development program is gaining any momentum.</p>	<p>The fate of the ID program hinges on the degree of security which is offered to the expanding ID movement. Without assurance of a secure environment the ID program will be limited or even hostile to the entire effort, and no real progress can be achieved.</p> <p>Progress has been about as good as can be expected from a government which at the start was weak administratively, lacked popular support and has been deeply involved in a war throughout its existence and suffers from competing programs sponsored by various US/OVN agencies. Great expectations for more rapid progress are not realistic under these conditions.</p> <p>ARVN has been slow in assuming its role in direct support of the ID program. There are now indications of increasing acceptance of and willingness to perform this mission. ARVN 23 battalions are now in place. ARVN units are being retrained and are being sent to the front. ARVN units are now being sent to the front against main force and provincial force units in order to keep them from the ID areas. In this respect, the US/PM forces have been and are now conducting between 40 and 50 percent of their operations against these forces. The need for this is graphically illustrated by the fact that the enemy in March alone directed 126 attacks against ID workers and teams which resulted in 231 workers being killed, wounded or missing. The ID program will continue to suffer until this situation is improved. The command and control capability with the expanding areas of the ID effort require increased US/PM forces in order to adequately secure the ID effort.</p>	JCSM 280-67



SPECIFIC ISSUE	THE ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/CSOS ON INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
6 Effectiveness of "cross-over point"	"The Army's... is... in... passive and active... work." In addition, reference to the Army included the appropriate... "... if we are now past the cross-over point" cannot be done without... if the enemy can conduct... "... from the business, can the military job be done even with them?"	While there is no single meaningful measure of the overall effectiveness of the point, there are certain useful measures of the overall effectiveness of the point. A recent OSD (SA) comparative analysis covered the period 1962-1967. It indicated that, when weighed by relative unit strengths, the ARVN was only about 20% as effective as the US unit in terms of enemy KIA/FWY/KA figures. While reform measures will continue to be implemented, the real benefit will be realized gradually, and will be essential to the successful conduct of the war and to a lasting peace in postwar Vietnam.  There has been some speculation that the "cross-over point" has occurred. Figures on enemy losses, recruitment, morale, and infiltration rate, and infiltration capability are tenuous and are based on so many variables that the point cannot be established. The utility of an indicator as nebulous as "cross-over point" in the analysis of progress in warfare is highly questionable in the near point. Little significance can be attached to an apparent cross-over point and force requirements must continue to be determined by the tasks to be accomplished and the enemy residual capability.	DA 2377-67
7 Distinction between "big" and "other" war in Vietnam	"The 'big war' is the one between the US and the North Vietnamese military units; it will not, probably, be the 'other war' against the VC; it still not quite well."	Exception is taken with the implied distinction that two wars are being pursued in Vietnam. This implied distinction is particularly germane in any discussion of effective utilization of forces. The distinction between the "big war" and "other war" can only be considered as integral and essential parts of the same war. The distinction is made inside or outside of South Vietnam. This is especially true in the field of force development and nation-building which require military actions to provide the requisite security for a successful program.	
8 Utilization of forces	In addressing a possibly more efficient utilization of forces, the DN suggests that "one of the conditions could be eliminated if the Army eschewed the Delta, and concentrated on the high ground. Force requirements could be eliminated if the US Marine proposal employed... forces, the DN points out: 'The question arises whether US... could be devoted to pacification or to the Delta. Are there not waters for the Vietnamese?'"	This statement is again indicative of an effort to separate the war into "big war" and "other war" categories. The US Army and Marine combat units are directly participating in providing the security at the strategic level, the propaganda of the American pacification effort is of an advisory level. The increased force character at the sector and subsector level. The conclusion of the war is based on recognition that a successful conclusion of the war requires the concurrent, sustained and unrelenting military pressure on all three components of forces: VC/PA main forces; provincial and district forces; and local guerrilla forces.	

III. MILITARY STRATEGY FOR AIR/NAVAL WAR IN THE NORTH

1. Abstracts:

a. DPM

(1) Further bombing in the North will be ineffective.

(2) A better plan would be to concentrate the bombing effort on the North Vietnamese "funnel" south of 20°.

b. JCS

(1) The US should conduct a comprehensive and coordinated air/naval campaign designed to achieve well defined objectives.

(2) Concentration of war effort on the "funnel" would be militarily advantageous.

(3) DPM should change in US policy, reversing the trend of gradually increasing pressures in the North.

(4) The air/naval campaign can be controlled independently of other elements of the war, to permit most effective application of this power in order to achieve objectives.

2. Specific Issues:

BASIC ISSUES	DPM ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/CJCS OR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
1 Relationship of Air/Naval War in the North to the Postulated Courses of Action.	<p>Course A - Further expansion of the bombing program in the North, accompanied by buildup of forces and increased military activity on the ground, especially outside of South Vietnam.</p> <p>Course B - Limit force increases; confine ground conflict to within the bounds of South Vietnam; and concentrate the bombing on the infiltration routes south of 20°.</p>	<p>The air/naval campaign against North Vietnam can be controlled independently of the other elements of the war. However, since all elements of the war are interdependent and complementary in their contribution toward attainment of the national objective, any reduction in the recommendation of the JCS/CJCS for a campaign against North Vietnam would be a reduction in the pressure against North Vietnam. The direct linking of a reduced force level in South Vietnam with reduced air/naval actions outside South Vietnam, as discussed in Course B, appears doubly invalid as a concept.</p>	<p>OCN 2377-67 JCSM 218-67 JCSM 286-67 OCN 2377-67</p>
2 Value of continued bombing in North Vietnam.	<p>No major military targets remain to be struck in the North, excluding the port areas. The war now appears that the continuation of the present occupation of North Vietnam territory will physically reduce the flow of men and materiel below the relatively small amount needed by enemy forces to continue the war in the South. Our effort can and does have severe disruptive effects, which Hanoi can and does compensate for. . . . There continues to be no sign that the bombing has reduced Hanoi's will to resist.</p>	<p>The United States should conduct a comprehensive and coordinated air/naval campaign which will: (1) increase the pressure on external resources; and (2) increase interdiction of infiltration routes in North Vietnam. Such an air campaign (1) should produce results which outweigh risks - political and military; (2) provides greater effectiveness, less cost in the long run, and clearer signal of US determination to Hanoi and the rest of the world; (3) should not cause CHICOM intervention; (4) will cause snowballing pressures on Hanoi and the rest of the world; (5) will cause the most significant action yet to be accomplished that would have the greatest impact on the NVN ability to continue the war is to obstruct and reduce importation of war-supporting materials.</p>	<p>JCSM 288-67 JCSM 218-67 JCSM 286-67 OCN 2377-67</p>
3 Hanoi insensitivity to increased bombing pressures.	<p>With respect to added pressure on the North, it is becoming apparent that Hanoi may already have "written off" all assets and lives that might be enjoyed by a "written off" strategy. The prospect of winning the "War of Attrition" in the South exists.</p>	<p>Granted that Hanoi has taken many measures to overcome the effects of the air campaign, nevertheless, the continued bombing against the air campaign supports this judgment. The outcome of the war, whether by political settlement or otherwise, will depend upon the cumulative effects of all US actions in Southeast Asia and the North Vietnamese willingness to continue. It is highly questionable that North Vietnam is willing to "write off" all assets and lives that might be lost when they could be saved by a move toward negotiations. There is, however, no indication that the North Vietnamese are willing to accept reciprocal military deactivation in return for a bombing reduction.</p>	<p>ME 11-11-67; DIA/CIA DOC #S-2138/AP-4 NSAM 328</p>
4 Military Value to COMUSMACV of Shift in Bombing Effort	<p>The lowest "ceiling" on infiltration can probably be achieved by concentration on the North Vietnam. This shift, despite possible effects on the pilot and aircraft loss rates by more than 50 percent. The shift will, if anything, be of positive military value to General Westmoreland while taking some steam out of the popular effort in the North. This shift of bombing strategy can, to military advantage, be made at any time, but the shift should be time to maximize the chances of getting Hanoi to negotiate.</p>	<p>In recent months the majority of our bombing effort in North Vietnam has been directed at Route Packages I, II, and III. For example in March, about 7,000 sorties were flown in these areas as compared to about 1,500 sorties in the remainder of North Vietnam. A shift in bombing effort to the remainder of North Vietnam would provide a shift in bombing effort which would be a complete shift of effort infiltrating into South Vietnam. However, a complete shift of effort would permit North Vietnam to concentrate its air defense system in the areas being struck, thus increasing our losses in those areas. Buildup in the northern part of North Vietnam and stockpiles there would be immune from attack, thereby making his problem much easier and releasing personnel and equipment for increased infiltration into South Vietnam. Increased infiltration into South Vietnam would result in increased infiltration into the northern part of North Vietnam, which might destroy more infiltrating targets, but the net result would be of positive military value to COMUSMACV. The shift in effort will reduce air losses, at least initially, until the relocation of enemy air defense systems into south North Vietnam.</p>	<p>CS 2377-67 DIA/CIA DOC #S-2138/AP-4 NSAM 10-1-66</p>

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BASIC ISSUES	DPM ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/CJCS OR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
<p>5 Mining Operations in North Vietnam</p>	<p>The program they [CINCPAC &amp; COMUSMACV] propose... would involve the virtual certainty of irresistible pressures... for the blockage of rail, road and sea imports... for mining of the harbors against Soviet and other ships.</p> <p>Why not escalate the bombing and mine the harbors... on the gamble that it would constrict the flow, meaningfully limiting enemy action in the South, and that it would bend Hanoi? The answer is that the costs and risks of the actions must be considered. These are cost in US lives; cost in domestic and world opinion; and most importantly, the likely Soviet, Chinese, and North Vietnamese reaction.</p>	<p>The effectiveness of IOC interdiction cannot be greatly improved until deep-water ports are closed or neutralized. It will then be worthwhile to intensify the interdiction effort against other LOC's in North Vietnam.</p> <p>Mining of NVN deep water ports will disrupt the major avenue of basic economic and military support and force the enemy to overload more vulnerable routes by rail, road, and shallow draft coastal and internal waterway shipping. Mining of internal waterways will create choke points, backup traffic and saturate alternate routes. (See also Section V, Paragraph 4, this column.)</p>	<p>CM 2377-67 JGSM 288-67</p>

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APPENDIX A

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IV. DOMESTIC ATTITUDE AND PREDICTED REACTIONS

1. Abstracts:

- a. DR: (1) Escalation makes war more unpopular and people want out of it one way or another.  
 (2) Reserve callup will be a divisive issue.  
 (3) Force buildup will create pressure for war expansion.
- b. JCS: (1) The majority of the people, although frustrated with an apparently endless war, still want their country to honor its commitments.  
 (2) In the long-term, Reserve callup is more likely to be a consolidating force than a divisive one.  
 (3) The American people have learned to accommodate to selective application of military power.

2. Specific issues:

SPECIFIC ISSUE	DEM ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/CJCS OR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
1 Dissatisfaction with progress of the war	The Vietnam war is unpopular, and becoming increasingly more so as it escalates. Most Americans do not understand the war. All of them want the war ended and expect their President to end it successfully. Or else.	The vocal but minor segment of the American people who oppose US policy in Vietnam, both those in public and private life, do not speak for the entire population. It is more probable that the vast majority of the population want to see their country fulfill its international obligations. An American characteristic is to face up to a job and get it over with as soon as possible. Accordingly, since no end can be seen to involvement in Southeast Asia, there is naturally a certain amount of frustration. However, the sense of frustration is not severe enough to support a "peace at any price" attitude.	CM 2377-67
2 Political difficulty of Reserve callup	Although increased force requirements will not lead to massive civil disobedience, a request for Congressional authority to call Reserves will lead to a divisive debate.	Callup of Reserves, a major increase in deployed forces, recommissioning of heavy F-4 ships, and an increase in air/naval pressures against North Vietnam would unquestionably evoke an immediate outburst from the vocal minority that already opposes US policy. However, in the long term, these actions should have a positive effect on the majority. National pride, spirit of unity, and patriotism should be aroused when the Government further demonstrates its resolve and determination to bring the war to an acceptable termination in the shortest feasible time.	CM 2377-67
3 Pressures for stronger action outside South Vietnam	The "hawk" faction will almost certainly impose irresistible pressures for stronger action outside South Vietnam.	President Johnson and other responsible officials have stated repeatedly that we want to avoid a wider war, and both the general public and Congress are well-conditioned to the policy of selective application of military power. Therefore, Reserve callup and/or controlled intensification of on-going actions (e.g., air/naval operations against North Vietnam) would not be expected to cause pressure for irresponsible escalation or for spreading the war beyond its current bounds. On the contrary, force buildup and graduated intensification of effort should quell the opinion held in some quarters that the United States is embarked on a "no-win" strategy. As a result, this should tend to discourage demands for higher levels of action than are militarily appropriate, or for withdrawal of US forces under less than honorable conditions.	CM 2377-67

V. INTERNATIONAL ATTITUDE AND PREDICTED REACTIONS

1. Abstracts:

- a. DEB: (1) PRC will not negotiate until after US elections.  
 (2) Intensified bombing will damage US image.  
 (3) Intensified actions will bring US closer to war with China and/or Russia.  
 (4) Minza Raipone will be a major factor in the US position on part of China and/or Russia.  
 (5) The USSR is the most probable "peace mediator".  
 (6) A post hostilities role for the VC should be explored.
- b. JCS: (1) Appropriate application of power might well bring about negotiations at any time.  
 (2) Intensified bombing will damage US international image and position.  
 (3) Neither the Soviets nor China are likely to seek a major confrontation with the US over actions the JCS have recommended in SEA.  
 (4) The USSR might become a "peace mediator" but US should not place primary reliance on this scheme.  
 (5) The Vietnam, as such, should not be accommodated within the GVN, but only integrated into national life as rehabilitated RVN citizens.

2. Specific Issues:

SPECIFIC ISSUE	DPM ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/CJCS OR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
1 Incentive for PRC to negotiate	<p>PRC probably has decided not to negotiate until after the November 1965 US elections. Further continuation of our current moderate policy may increase force levels and actions against the North are likely to change their mind.</p>	<p>There is no factual basis for estimating a desirable nor of identifying the critical issues in the North Vietnamese decision to negotiate. It is generally accepted in the intelligence community that a combination of pressure - lack of success in SVN, increasing loss of US prestige in RVN, and constant reminders of US power and determination - ultimately force them to accept negotiation. Air/mar operations against RVN contribute to this line of thinking. However, because this is where the US has best control of the intensity level, it is not likely to be used in a short period of time that would be more likely to induce negotiation than would gradual escalation, since that would be much more difficult to accommodate.</p>	<p>JCSM 288-67                  ON 2377-67                  SRE 10-12-65</p>
2 International reaction to intensified bombing of RVN	<p>The picture of the world's greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 100,000 people a week, while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission, is not a pretty one. It could conceivably produce a major disruption in the American national consciousness and in the world image of the United States.</p>	<p>World reaction would generally follow the pattern already established for past expansion of air operations over RVN. Those critical of US actions would regard an escalation of the war would be more vocal in their criticisms; but overall, the US would not contribute a sharp departure from attitudes currently held concerning the war. There would be some pressure to undertake massive destruction of civilian populations. Some nations, especially in the Middle East, would privately, if not publicly, lead our actions as an indication of US aims, would probably support the US in some other international organization. Some nations may be moved to provide assistance to RVN but, save for those powers now providing it, no additional military support is likely.</p>	<p>SRE 10-12-65                  ON 2377-67</p>
3 Effect of increased US determination	<p>Increased force levels and actions against the North are likely to get us in even deeper in Southeast Asia and into a serious confrontation, if not war, with China and Russia.</p>	<p>It is estimated that the Chinese are not prepared to resort to strong and direct action to prevent the US from continuing its operations in Southeast Asia. It seems likely that they will continue to support the US program by providing additional quantities and perhaps new types of arms and equipment. Beyond supplying equipment, they could take certain other actions to warn the US. For example, they might believe that the provision of arms to the DRV or to some other international organization, or possibly aircraft, would serve as a warning of intent leading to a serious confrontation.</p> <p>It is estimated that the Chinese communists would provide a major troop presence in Southeast Asia (1) if requested by RVN; (2) if there were a major ground invasion of RVN; (3) if the North regime were in danger of collapse. Short of these conditions, the Chinese are expected to avoid a serious confrontation.</p>	<p>ON 2377-67                  SRE 11-11-67</p> <p>ON 2377-67</p>
4 Sino/Soviet reaction to mining Raipone	<p>Mining the harbors would place Moscow in a particularly galling position. It would present the Soviet position and prestige in such a disadvantageous place that the USSR would not force a confrontation in Southeast Asia but they might seek a solution in Korea, Turkey, Iran, the Middle East or, most likely, Berlin.</p> <p>China could be expected to side upon the harbor-mining as the opportunity to discredit the USSR. The USSR would see an indication that the US was going to apply pressure until RVN capitulated or that there would be an eventual invasion. If so, they might decide to intervene with combat troops and air power.</p>	<p>The mining or blockade of the RVN coast would be most likely to create an atmosphere of heightened tension between the US and the USSR. It would constitute a direct challenge to the USSR. At a minimum they would try to influence world opinion against the US, and, depending on the attitude of RVN, they might attempt to bring the US to the UN. There is little that they could do on the scene, since they do not have the means to force a blockade or to confront the US with a major military challenge. The USSR would want to take the risk of provoking by such pressures a major and generalized crisis.</p> <p>If Communist China read the harbor-mining as falling under one of the conditions set forth in the foregoing issue, they might feel compelled to intervene. However, more likely they would not precipitate a confrontation solely on the basis of mining operations.</p>	<p>SRE 10-12-65                  SRE 11-11-67                  ON 2377-67</p>

941103-211





SOURCE	OBJECTIVES AS POLICIES PROMOTED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE				REFERENCED BY JCS MILITARY CONCEPTS (Copy to MILITARY CONCEPTS IN JCSM 22-27 above)			
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOLOGICAL	GM 1	GM 2	GM 3	GM 4
						Yes	Yes	Yes	MA
	<p>(c) We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a ceasefire agreement.</p> <p>(d) We know that air attacks alone will not accomplish all of these purposes. But it is our best and prayerful judgment that they are a necessary part of the surest road to peace.</p> <p>e. I would hope that the Secretary General of the United Nations would use the prestige of his great office and his deep knowledge of Asia to initiate, as soon as possible, with the aid of the United States, a plan for cooperation in increased development.</p> <p>f. For our part I will ask the Congress to join in a billion-dollar American investment in this effort as soon as it is available. I would hope that all nations in this region, including the Soviet Union, will join in this effort to replace despair with hope and terror with progress. The task is nothing less than to enrich the hopes and existence of more than a hundred million people. And there is much to be done.</p>	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	MA
3. (U) Statement by President Johnson - 27 April 1965 (Department of State Bulletin, 17 May 1965)	<p>We have not changed our essential purpose. That purpose is peaceful settlement. That purpose is to resist aggression. That purpose is to avoid wider war.</p>	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
4. (U) Message to Congress from President Johnson - 1 June 1965 (S. Doc. 195, 89th Cong., First Session)	<p>For our part, I propose that we expand our own economic assistance to the people of South Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos. I propose we start now to make available our share of the money needed to have the resources of the entire Southeast Asia region to the benefit of all its people. This must be an international venture.</p>			X		MA	MA	Yes	MA
5. (U) Foreign Affairs Outline No. 13, entitled "The US Stance in Southeast Asia," Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State - June 1965	<p>a. The nations of Southeast Asia, as with all other Asian states, should develop as free and independent countries according to their own views and toward increasingly democratic structures.</p> <p>b. The nations of the area should not threaten each other or outside nations.</p> <p>c. No single Asian nation should either control other nations or exercise domination either for the whole area or for any major part of it.</p> <p>d. The nations of the Far East should maintain and increase their ties with the West in trade and culture as a major means of knitting together a peaceful and stable world.</p>	X	X	X	X	MA	MA	MA	Yes
6. (U) Letter from Ambassador Goldberg to the Secretary of State - 1 July 1965 (US Mission to the UN Press Release 650)	<p>a. The United States will continue to provide, in whatever amount and on whatever terms are necessary, assistance to the people of the Republic of Vietnam in their struggle for independence, their sovereignty, and their right to choose their own government and make their own decisions.</p> <p>b. The United States will continue to assist in the economic and social advancement of Southeast Asia. The economic progress of Asian countries and the United Nations, and will continue to explore all additional possibilities, especially in connection with the great projects taking shape in the Lower Mekong Basin.</p>	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

B-2

Appendix B

941103-214



SOURCE	OBJECTIVE AS PUBLICLY PUNISHED BY US OFFICIALS	SCORE OF OBSERVATIVE				APPROVED BY US MILITARY CONTRACTORS (Legend: US Military Observations in JCSM, EUB-SJ above)			
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOLOGICAL	OBJ 1	OBJ 2	OBJ 3	OBJ 4
	<p>c. The United States will continue to explore, independently and in conjunction with others, all possible routes to an honorable and durable peace in Southeast Asia.</p> <p>d. The United States stands ready, as it has in the past, to collaborate unconditionally with members of the Security Council in the search for a peaceful settlement to restore peace and security to that area of the world.</p>	X				MA	MA	MA	Yes
7. (U) State Department Press Release No. 4 - 17 January 1966	<p>Fourteen Points for Peace in Southeast Asia:</p> <p>(1) The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia.</p> <p>(2) We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or on any part thereof.</p> <p>(3) We would welcome "negotiations without preconditions" as the 17 nations put it.</p> <p>(4) We would welcome unconditional discussions as President Johnson put it.</p> <p>(5) A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions.</p> <p>(6) Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish to propose.</p> <p>(7) We want no US bases in Southeast Asia.</p> <p>(8) We do not desire to retain US troops in South Vietnam after peace is assured.</p> <p>(9) We support free elections in South Vietnam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice.</p> <p>(10) The question of reunification of Vietnam should be decided by the Vietnamese through their own free decision.</p> <p>(11) The countries of Southeast Asia can be non-aligned or neutral if that is their option.</p> <p>(12) We would much prefer to see our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Vietnam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars.</p> <p>(13) The President has said "The Viet Cong would not have difficulty being repatriated and having their views represented if there were a government of their own to whom they could be repatriated. I don't think that would be an insurmountable problem."</p> <p>(14) We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North Vietnam if the North Vietnamese from the other side as to that they would do if the bombing stopped.</p>	X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
6. (U) State of the Union Message of President Johnson to a Joint Session of Congress - 12 January 1966	<p>a. We seek neither territory nor bases, economic domination or military alliance in Vietnam. We fight for the principle of self-determination - that the people of South Vietnam should be able to choose their own course, choose it in free elections and choose it in a free and open atmosphere. The question of all Vietnam should make a free decision on the great question of reunification. This is all we want for South Vietnam.</p>	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

02-103-215



SOURCE	OBJECTIVE AS PUBLICLY PROMULGATED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE				SUPPORTED BY JCS MILITARY OBJECTIVES (Keyed to Military Objectives in JCSM 210-67 above)			
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOLOGICAL	OBJ 1	OBJ 2	OBJ 3	OBJ 4
12. (C) State Circular Telegram to all Diplomatic Posts (State 22658-JCS IN 33308) - 5 August 1966	<p><b>Essential Points of US Policy:</b></p> <p>(1) The United States is absolutely determined to continue its efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam situation and will not withdraw from this position until the aggression ceases and South Vietnam is left alone to determine its own future free of outside coercion.</p> <p>(2) The US bombing of North Vietnam is restricted to military targets which are being used by Hanoi in support of the aggression against South Vietnam. The United States remains prepared to cease this bombing provided Hanoi takes reciprocal action.</p> <p>(3) The United States continues its offer for unconditional discussions toward a peaceful settlement, including the four points set forth by North Vietnam. The United States reports a settlement based on the essentials of the 1974 and 1966 Geneva Accords.</p> <p>(4) The United States does not threaten the existence of the regime of North Vietnam. We hold no animosity toward the people of North Vietnam. We are ready to discuss with them the possibility of their government the prospect of cooperation in economic development when peace has been restored.</p> <p>(5) The United States does not want to maintain bases in South Vietnam. We are ready to discuss with them the possibility of our troops leaving South Vietnam when its security and freedom of choice is assured.</p> <p>(6) The United States does not oppose the reunification of Vietnam. We support the right of the Vietnamese people to determine their own future through the free choice of the Vietnamese people. Likewise, the United States does not oppose the neutrality or non-alignment of all the countries of Southeast Asia if that is their desire.</p> <p>(7) Our policy is limited: the United States seeks only to stop communist aggression; it is not attacking communism itself. We are in Vietnam to demonstrate the unprofitability of aggression and to prevent the spread of communist aggression. We have done this for the aid of South Vietnam, at its request and under the right of collective self-defense, in the face of a protracted aggression of a ruthless and relentless character. Without the application of our military power, South Vietnam would have been overrun by North Vietnam's aggression against the South, there would be no chance of persuading Hanoi to leave its neighbor alone. The smaller nations throughout the world have a critical stake in this principle, and in the effort to maintain the integrity of South Vietnam.</p>	X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
13. (C) Briefing by Secretary McNamara to the Cabinet - 25 August 1966	<p>US military objectives are threefold:</p> <p>a. To seek out and destroy the main units of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese.</p> <p>b. To facilitate the infiltration of men and material from North Vietnam into South Vietnam.</p> <p>c. To provide a screen of security behind which the revolutionary development of South Vietnam can take place.</p>	X	X			Yes**	Yes	Yes	Yes

\*\* JCS objective includes a task to defeat enemy armed forces in RVN rather than the Secher "seek out and destroy" which, together with the JCS objective to force the withdrawal of RVN forces, is an apparent contradiction. The Secher objective does not include forcing the withdrawal of RVN forces.

\*\*\* JCS objective supports the Secher objective but goes beyond it with tasks to destroy the VC and the VC campaign will cause the RVN to cease direction of the VC insurgency. Secher objective focuses on the more limited task of stopping the flow of men and material from NVN into RVN.

\*\*\*\* JCS objective is interpreted to mean that US forces have the prime responsibility for extending GVN control. However, the implementing tasks clearly indicate that the US forces assist the GVN in the RVN mission. Secher objective limits the US role to providing security so that the GVN may accomplish RVO.

\*\*\*\*\* The Secher objectives have no parallel for JCS Objective 4.

SOURCE	OBJECTIVES AS PUBLICLY PROCLAIMED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE					SUPPORTED BY JCS MILITARY OBJECTIVES (Keyed to Military Objectives in JCSM-210-47 above)		
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOLOGICAL	DN 1	DN 2	DN 3	DN 4
14. (U) Statement by Secretary McNamara to the Press in Saigon - 14 October 1966	The United States is not fighting to overthrow the communist regime in North Vietnam nor to destroy its government. We are fighting to bring about a peaceful South Vietnam to share their own political destiny.	X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
15. (U) Manila Conference 25 Oct 1966	<p>a. To restore peace in SVN and the rest of Asia.</p> <p>b. To preserve the territorial integrity of SVN.</p> <p>c. To reunify Vietnam by free choice of all Vietnamese.</p> <p>d. To reconcile all elements of Vietnamese society.</p> <p>e. To withdraw all foreign forces as NV military and subversive forces are withdrawn, infiltration ceases and level of violence subsides.</p> <p>f. To achieve end of hostilities settlement which incorporates effective guarantees against further aggression.</p> <p>g. To force NVN to abandon aggression.</p> <p>h. To modernize agriculture.</p> <p>i. To achieve desirable land reform and land tenure system.</p> <p>j. To achieve economic prosperity through regional development.</p> <p>k. To overcome poverty, disease, illiteracy, social injustice.</p> <p>l. To create a SVN civil government based on honesty and justice.</p>	X	X		X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
16. (U) State of the Union message of President Johnson to a Joint Session of the Congress - 10 January 1967	<p>a. We are in Vietnam because the United States and our allies are committed by the 1950 Treaty to "act to meet the common danger" of aggression in Southeast Asia.</p> <p>b. We are in Vietnam because an international agreement signed by the United States, North Vietnam and others in 1962 is being systematically violated by the communists. That violation threatens the independence of all the small nations in Southeast Asia and the peace of the entire region.</p> <p>c. We are there because the people of South Vietnam have as much right to remain non-communist -- if that is what they choose -- as North Vietnam has to remain communist.</p>	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
17. (U) Statement of Secretary McNamara before the House Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations and the Senate Subcommittee on Defense Budget, 1967-72 Defense Program and 1968 Defense Budget.	<p>a. At the President's direction, the policies and objectives of the United States Government with respect to Vietnam have been consistently and firmly supported by the United States and our allies. Among the points he made were the following:</p> <p>(1) Ours is a strictly limited aim.</p> <p>(2) We are not engaged in a "Holy War" against communism.</p> <p>(3) We do not seek to establish an American empire or a sphere of influence in Asia.</p>	X	X	X	X	Yes*	MA	MA	Yes

\* JCSM 792-66 recommends the reintegration of individuals to VC as individuals into the national life.

B-6

Appendix B

SOURCE

OBJECTIVES AS PUBLICLY PROCLAIMED BY US OFFICIALS

(4) We seek no military bases, no permanent establishment of troops, no permanent American "presence" of any kind in South Vietnam.

(5) We do not seek the overthrow of the Government of North Vietnam.

(6) We do not seek to threaten any legitimate interest of the people of China.

(7) We do not ask of North Vietnam an unconditional surrender or indeed the surrender of anything that belongs to it; nor do we seek to exclude any segment of the South Vietnamese population from participating by peaceful means in their country's future.

b. Let us say affirmatively and succinctly what our aims are.

(1) We want a political solution, not a military solution, to this conflict. Similarly, we reject the idea that North Vietnam has a right to impose a military solution.

(2) We seek to assure the people of South Vietnam the same right of self-determination -- to decide their own political destiny, free of force -- that the United Nations Charter affirms for all.

(3) And we believe that reunification of Vietnam should be decided upon through a free choice by the peoples of both the North and South without outside interference, the results of which choice we are fully prepared to support.

18. (S) Statement of Secretary McNamara before a Joint Session of the Senate and Service Committees and the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Relations Appropriations - Fiscal Year 1967 Supplemental for Southeast Asia - 23 January 1967

a. Our over-all policy objective in South Vietnam is a stable and independent government free of external control and externally inspired and supported violence.

b. Our immediate objective is to influence the North Vietnamese to withdraw their troops and to cease their aggression. The basic tasks which flow from these objectives are:

- (1) To support the re-establishment of the authority of the Government of South Vietnam over its territory.
- (2) To interdict the flow of men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam.
- (3) To exert pressure on the Government of North Vietnam to cease its direction and support of the insurgency in South Vietnam.

SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE

MILITARY

ECONOMICS

SOLOGICAL

SUPPORTED BY JCS MILITARY OBJECTIVES (Refer to Military Objectives in JCSM 216-57 above)

OBJ 1

OBJ 2

OBJ 3

OBJ 4

NA

Yes\*\*

MA

Yes\*\*

NA

Yes\*\*\*

MA

MA

MA

Yes\*\*\*\*

MA

MA

Yes#

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Yes##

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\* SecDef objective providing for interdiction is more limited in scope and therefore more in consonance with Ambassador Goldberg's point than is JCS objective.

\*\* SecDef and SecDef objectives support this point. However, SecDef emphasizes providing a screen by US forces thus, by inference, de-emphasizes the United States extending dominion and control.

\*\*\* Programs in support of JCS Objective 1 tend to obscure this point of Ambassador Goldberg. SecDef objective calling for interdiction is more limited, and supporting programs might make this point more obscure.

\*\*\*\* JCS Objective 1 contemplates defeat of CHICOM aggression if necessary, while SecDef does not allude to this contingency. JCS Objective 1 is therefore broader in scope. However, the CHICOM contingency undoubtedly receives consideration though not mentioned by SecDef in unclassified testimony. Reintegration of national life.

# The broader JCS objective gives rise to courses of action which tend to obscure the political solution sought. SecDef corollary objective of interdiction is more limited.

## The broader JCS objective gives rise to courses of action which tend to obscure the political solution sought. SecDef corollary objective of interdiction is more limited.

### The JCS objective could be interpreted to mean that US forces have prime responsibility for maintaining own control. However, the implementing task is to assist the GVN in R/D. The SecDef objective emphasizes the US support role.

\*\*\*\* The SecDef objectives do not include a parallel for JCS Objective 4, although they undoubtedly receive consideration.

**SECRET**

SOURCE	OBJECTIVES AS PUBLICLY PROCLAIMED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE				SUPPORTED BY JOE MILITARY OBJECTIVES (Refer to Military Objectives in JCS 210-07 above)			
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOLOGICAL	OBJ. 1	OBJ. 2	OBJ. 3	OBJ. 4
<p>Department of Defense News Release 22-47 - 24 February 1967</p>	<p>a. The communists once again are preparing that we should be moved painlessly in the quantities desired by North Vietnam, the United States fighting men and our allies infiltration routes from North Vietnam and over the border into South Vietnam. The communists have made no progress in the position put forward by the Paris. It demands such a permanent cessation of United States bombing. The United States will continue to make North Vietnam a free nation. The country will not stop the bombing and further military action. The United States will stop the bombing in return for appropriate de-escalation of military action by the North Vietnamese.</p> <p>b. None of these is our objective. Our objective is to shape their own destiny. We believe North Vietnam the right of the political and economic institutions under which to do so without the threat, the pressure from external power.</p> <p>c. Now, since that is a limited objective, we should seek to accomplish it at the lowest cost. The lowest cost in terms of lives. That, of course, means we should take steps to minimize the risk of increasing the conflict. We should do this by increasing the cost to us in terms of American lives. And this is the foundation of our bombing policy.</p> <p>4. Now since that is our objective, we sought to accomplish three things by the bombing:</p> <p>(1) To raise the morale of the South Vietnamese.</p> <p>(2) To either reduce the level of infiltration of men and equipment from North to South or to increase the cost of that infiltration.</p> <p>(3) To make clear to the political leaders of the North that they pay a price as long as they continue to carry on in their aggression of the South.</p>	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<p>20. (U) Address by Ambassador Oulberry to the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan, Tokyo - 25 February 1967</p>	<p>a. The United States will negotiate on Vietnam only with the objective of ending the war and not merely to de-escalate.</p> <p>b. The United States sincerely seeks a political settlement rather than unconditional surrender, although it is not interested in negotiations with less than a full settlement in mind.</p>	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<p>21. (U) News Conference by Secretary McNamara in Washington, D. C. - 24 February 1967</p>	<p>a. We have a very limited objective in Southeast Asia today - very, very limited. We are not looking for any setting bases from which we can carry out attacks on Red China. We are not even seeking to establish relationships with North Vietnam. We are only looking for a military ally, or in terms of which they will provide permanent military bases on the land mass of Southeast Asia.</p>	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<p>22. (U) News Conference by President Johnson in Washington, D. C. - 27 February 1967</p>	<p>Our principal objective in North Vietnam is to provide the maximum deterrent to people who believe aggression pays, with a minimum cost to us - and to them.</p>	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<p>(U) Address by President Johnson to the Tennessee State Legislature - 13 March 1967</p>	<p>a. Three basic US objectives:</p> <p>(1) An honorable peace, that will leave the people of South Vietnam free to fashion their own political and economic institutions without fear of terror or intimidation from the North.</p> <p>(2) A Southeast Asia in which all countries - including a powerful North Vietnam - apply their scarce resources to the well-being of their people, combating hunger, ignorance, and disease.</p> <p>(3) A concrete demonstration that aggression across international frontiers or demarcation lines is no longer an acceptable means of political change.</p>	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

B-5

Appendix B

SOURCE	OBJECTIVES AS PUBLICLY PROCLAIMED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE				SUPPORTED BY JCS MILITARY OBJECTIVES (Refer to MILITARY OBJECTIVES FOR PAR. 57 above)			
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOLOGICAL	DIR 1	DIR 2	DIR 3	DIR 4
	<p>b. Three purposes in selective bombing of military targets in North Vietnam:</p> <p>(1) To back our fighting men by denying the enemy a sanctuary.</p> <p>(2) To exact a penalty against North Vietnam for her flagrant violations of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962.</p> <p>(3) To limit the flow, or to substantially increase the cost of infiltration of men and material from North Vietnam.</p>	X	X		X	Yes	MA	MA	Yes
24. (U) Owan Communique - 21 March 1967	Defend freedom in South Vietnam and at the same time continue the earnest search for an honorable peace.	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
25. (U) Statement to the Press by President Johnson in Washington, D. C., upon his return from the West Coast (20-21 March 1967) - 22 March 1967	We shall persevere in our efforts to find an honorable peace. Until that is achieved, we shall of course continue to do our duty in Vietnam.	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes